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Abstract 
This paper empirically examines how dispersions across investors beliefs influence 
traders order submission decisions in the foreign exchange market. Previous research has 
found that dispersion in traders beliefs regarding future macroeconomic announcements 
has a significant impact on both price dynamics and trading volume before the 
announcements in the foreign exchange and other financial markets. However, little is 
known about how this dispersion impacts traders choice in submitting different types of 
orders and thus to supply and demand liquidity either before or after such 
announcements. Since the types of orders submitted by traders at these times are the 
building blocks of the observed price and trading dynamics, it is important to understand 
how differences in investors’ information sets before and after important macroeconomic 
announcements affect their order submission decisions. We find that (i) belief dispersion 
affects the size and aggressiveness of orders both before and after macroeconomic 
announcements, (ii) the magnitude of the impact of factors known to affect order choice 
depends on the level of belief dispersion, and (iii) the influence of information shocks 
(the revelation of unexpected information) on order choices depends on the level of belief 
dispersion. 
JEL classification: D4, G1 
Bank classification: Exchange rates; Market structure and pricing 
Résumé 
Les auteurs examinent empiriquement comment la dispersion des croyances des 
investisseurs influence le choix des ordres que ceux-ci passent sur le marché des changes. 
D’après les travaux antérieurs, la dispersion des attentes quant aux nouvelles 
macroéconomiques à venir a une nette incidence sur la dynamique des prix et le volume 
des transactions sur le marché des changes et les autres marchés financiers à l’approche 
de l’annonce de données macroéconomiques. Cependant, on ignore presque tout des 
effets que peut avoir cette dispersion sur le choix du type d’ordre et donc sur l’offre et la 
demande de liquidité avant et après de telles annonces. Comme la nature des ordres 
passés à ces moments-là explique une large part de la dynamique observée des prix et des 
transactions, il importe de saisir comment l’hétérogénéité des informations dont disposent 
les investisseurs avant et après la publication de nouvelles macroéconomiques majeures 
influe sur leurs décisions. Les auteurs concluent que : 1) la dispersion des croyances a 
une incidence sur la taille et la compétitivité des ordres tant avant qu’après les annonces 
d’ordre macroéconomique; 2) l’ampleur de l’effet des facteurs qui ont une action avérée 
sur le choix des ordres est fonction du degré de dispersion des croyances; 3) l’influence 
des chocs d’information (la révélation de renseignements inattendus) sur le choix des 
ordres dépend elle aussi du degré de dispersion des croyances. 
Classification JEL : D4, G1 
Classification de la Banque : Taux de change; Structure de marché et fixation des prix  I. Introduction
Existing research has conﬁrmed that there are signiﬁcant differences in economic agents expectations
(for example, Frankel and Froot (1990), Mankiw, Reis and Wolfers (2003), Swanson (2006)) and that
this heterogeneity in expectations has a signiﬁcant impact on observed price dynamics and trading
volume (e.g. Shalen (1993), Berger et al. (2008), Jongen et al. (2008), Yan and Xiong (2009)).
To help us understand how the differences in traders information inﬂuences their trading behavior,
market microstructure researchers have proposed various models of trading behavior which explicitly
relate trading to various measures of public and private information (for surveys see OHara (1995)
and Madhavan (2000)). Despite the evidence that differences in traders expectations inﬂuence prices,
little empirical work has examined the process by which the heterogeneity in expectations (or belief
dispersions) affects the traders’ choice to supply and demand liquidity 1. Since the choice of which
types of orders traders submit plays an important role in understanding the dynamics in prices and
volumes, this is an important question for researchers in both the areas of market microstructure and
assetpricing. Thisquestionalsohasbroaderimplicationsasthequantityofinformationbeingprocessed
by traders and the number of ﬁnancial markets using electronic (order driven) trading platforms both
continue to increase.
In this paper we examine how the dispersion of investors’ beliefs before macroeconomic announce-
ments inﬂuences traders’ order submission decisions in the foreign exchange market before and after
signiﬁcant macroeconomic announcements. Because of the importance of these announcements, sur-
veys are regularly performed of the professional analysts before the forecasts to estimate the dispersion
in their forecasts (i.e., the dispersion in their beliefs and market expectations) before the announcement
as well as the magnitude of the surprise contained in the announcement (i.e., how signiﬁcant was the
difference between the expected and actual announcements?). We can therefore examine how changes
in the type and level of information available to traders impacts their order submission decisions 2.
1Liquidity refers to the quantity of orders standing in the limit order book against which an incoming order can be
executed. Supplying (demanding) liquidity therefore increases (decreases) the depth of orders standing in the limit order
book.
2When talking about traders order submission decisions, we are concentrating on the two key characteristics of each
order. The ﬁrst is the type of order. Traders can either submit market orders which are executed immediately against the
1Formally, the heterogeneity in investors expectations (belief dispersion) is captured by the second
moment of professional analysts’ forecasts preceding each macroeconomic announcement. Our mea-
sure of the information shock from the announcement is deﬁned as the difference between the median
investors forecast and the actual announcement. We can therefore estimate how traders order submis-
sion decisions depend on the heterogeneity in expectations regarding future economic conditions before
the announcement and the magnitude of changes in the information used by investors afterwards. These
are two of the most important factors in market microstructure models of order choice but they have
been rarely tested empirically. We are therefore examining whether less consensus among market par-
ticipants before an announcement leads to traders supplying (demanding) more or less liquidity? And
how this dispersion and any associated changes in liquidity may inﬂuence traders reactions to new, un-
expected information contained in the announcements? Despite the importance of these questions and
the number of mechanisms which have been proposed to explain how this information will inﬂuence
order submissions in the theoretical microstructure literature, there is little agreement in the literature
and even less empirical insight into these questions.
Because information and uncertainty both play key roles in our analysis, it is important to clearly
deﬁne what we mean by these terms. As noted in Llambros and Zarnowitz (1987), belief dispersion
(or the heterogeneity across investors expectations) is related to, but conceptually different, from un-
certainty: belief dispersion is the second moment of analysts forecasts but uncertainty is the second
moment of the value of the underlying fundamentals, which is unobservable. Thus exactly what belief
dispersion is capturing remains an open question. There are two potential interpretations for belief dis-
persion. First, belief dispersion may be capturing the differences in investors’ expectations regarding
an upcoming announcement. In this case, once the announcement is made, the uncertainty should be
resolved and belief dispersion should no longer have an effect on order submission strategies. Sec-
ond, belief dispersion may be correlated with market participants uncertainty regarding fundamental
best quote standing in the order book or limit orders which are executed at a speciﬁc price. Since limit orders designate a
price for execution, they are subject to execution risk if no order is submitted on the other side of the market at that price or
better. Market orders are, however, subject to price risk as it is unknown the price at which the market order will execute
but it is not to subject to execution risk. Consequently, market orders are considered more aggressive as they are submitted
to ensure rapid order execution with the potential risk that it may be at a less advantageous price. The second is the size of
the order.
2information on the value of the asset. As Kim and Verrechia (1994) point out, if this is the case, the
announcement itself may not remove the heterogeneity in market participants understanding of the fun-
damentals. The latter is a commonly adopted assumption in the microstructure literature as it provides
a motivation for trade both before and after announcements (e.g. Green (2004) and Pasquariello and
Vega (2007)). Recent literature also suggests that heterogeneous expectations affect the side on which
traders want to submit orders (e.g. Sarkar and Schwartz (2009)). Our study offers a unique opportunity
to explore these issues.
The order submission data we examine in this paper comes from the Reuters electronic limit order
market in the Canadian dollar - US dollar currency pair during 2005. For our announcements, we focus
on the order submission information around major regularly scheduled macroeconomic announcements
in Canada and the United States. We use data from the foreign exchange market for several reasons.
Beyond the obvious advantages that foreign exchange trading data is based on a very large and liquid
market, there are also other advantages for our study. For example, the foreign exchange market has
continuous trading by a large number of sophisticated traders. Not having speciﬁc opening and closing
hours limits concerns related to liquidity changes during the day related to the opening and closing of
markets. This is especially relevant when trying to study the impact of news announcements which
are frequently scheduled before local ﬁnancial markets open because of the signiﬁcant information
contained in the announcements. In a related fashion, the foreign exchange market is also especially
useful because we can easily identify the announcements of relevance and measure investors’ expec-
tations regarding these announcements and subsequently determine how the uncertainty regarding the
announcement was resolved.
In our analysis, we model traders order submission choices by formally recognizing that the order
submission decision involves both the choice of order type (e.g., market or limit order) and order size.
We capture this by employing a simultaneous equation framework including standard variables found
to inﬂuence traders order submission decisions in previous research. We divide our analysis into three
parts. In the ﬁrst stage of analysis, we examine the order submission decision across the periods with
and without announcements. We ﬁnd that orders tends to be of smaller size and traders are more
3sensitive to changes in the state of the limit order book on announcement days. Traders submit smaller
orders and tends to submit less aggressive orders than non-announcement days when price risk increase
and more aggressive orders than non-announcement days when execution risk increases.
In the second part of the analysis, we examine how belief dispersion affect order submission strate-
gies before and after announcement. Before announcement, order aggressiveness decreases with dis-
persion i.e. traders tends to submit limit orders when belief dispersion is large. As the magnitude
of belief dispersion increases, we ﬁnd that the information content of independent variables decreases
and thus their impact on traders order submissions decreases. This suggests that traders are extracting
information from other sources or not trusting the information from orders standing in the limit order
book or standard market characteristics at times of increased uncertainty.
After announcement, we examine whether belief dispersion is capturing only uncertainty about
the outcome of announcement or if it is capturing a more broad measure of uncertainty, by examin-
ing whether belief dispersion still has an inﬂuence on order submission strategies after the announce-
ment. We ﬁnd that it does still inﬂuence traders order submissions after the announcement, but its role
changes over time. In the 15 minute interval immediately following the announcement, order aggres-
siveness continues to decrease with dispersion. This suggests that traders react to dispersion before and
immediately after the announcement by continuing to submit limit orders to protect themselves from
price uncertainty after the announcement. In the second 15-minute interval after the announcement,
order aggressiveness starts to increase but the effect is still attenuated when the dispersion before the
announcement is wide. This result suggests that traders switch to more aggressive orders less quickly
if the belief dispersion before the announcement had been wide.
In the last part of the analysis, we examine how the magnitude of information shocks (i.e., the sur-
prise component of the announcement) affects order submission decisions and whether traders reaction
to information shocks conditions on belief dispersion. There is very little literature in this area. Most of
the recent studies focus on the impact of information shocks from announcement days on price discov-
ery (for example, Pasquariello and Vega (2007)) or how quickly new information is incorporated into
prices (e.g. Green (2004)). We consider how both belief dispersion and information shocks inﬂuence
4traders actual order submission decisions. Consistent with our expectations, we ﬁnd that traders tend
to submit less aggressive orders as the magnitude of the information shock increases. By separating
orders into those during high and low dispersion, we ﬁnd that there is only a minor role played by
information shocks in traders order submission decisions in periods when belief dispersion was low.
This suggests that traders tend to avoid the price risk associated with market orders following large in-
formation shocks but the size of the relationship between order submission strategies and information
shocks depends on the overall information environment as captured by the belief dispersion.
The rest of the paper develops with the next section discussing literature in this area and how we
extend it. Section three presents our data. The presentation and motivation for our models as well as
the discussions of the results follow in the fourth section. The ﬁnal section concludes.
II. Literature Review
Our paper complements the growing literature at the intersection of market microstructure and asset
pricing. UndertheEfﬁcientMarketsHypothesiswhichformstheheartofmuchofmodernassetpricing,
all price relevant information will be quickly and accurately incorporated into prices. The market
microstructure literature examines the channels through which this information is incorporated into
prices. The theoretical microstructure literature suggests that market participants are asymmetrically
informed and this asymmetry of beliefs regarding the future value of an asset inﬂuences how traders
submit orders and thus how prices are ultimately set in the market (for surveys see O’Hara (1995), and
Parlour and Seppi (2008)).
The most important factor inﬂuencing traders order submission decisions is information. In one of
the ﬁrst microstructure models explaining the role of trade in setting prices, the Kyle (1985) model,
equilibrium prices are derived under the assumption that traders are asymmetrically informed. The
asymmetry of information and liquidity of the market are two of the key factors in this model and form
the core of much of the subsequent literature and our empirical tests.
Moving beyond the Kyle model, other papers have more carefully examined the factors inﬂuencing
liquidity such as order type (e.g., whether traders submit market or limit orders). Starting with the
5seminal works of Demsetz (1968), Cohen et al. (1981) and Glosten (1994), a core assumption in this
research has been that informed traders submit market orders to take advantage of their information
before it is fully reﬂected in the market. As Copeland and Galai (1983) point out, the commitment to
trade at a set price associated with a limit order provides liquidity to the market but puts these orders at
an informational disadvantage as they can be picked off by traders arriving later with more up-to-date
information. Subsequent studies endogenize informed traders’ order choice decisions and consider the
role of market characteristics such as market volatility, the state of the limit order book and the rate of
order arrival (for a recent survey see Parlour and Seppi (2008)). To simplify these models, the size of
orders is generally assumed to be a constant (e.g., one unit). As a result, there are few studies explaining
the role of size in the order submission decision. Though not a focus of the papers, Goettler, Parlour
and Rajan (2009) and Rosu (2010) mention the role quantity can play in the order submission decision
- traders may choose to submit more aggressive orders if they are smaller in size.
Because of difﬁculties in measuring many of the features included in the theoretical models, the
empirical literature predominantly examines how changing market conditions affect the order submis-
sion decision. The empirically observable changes in market conditions considered are indirect proxies
for the level of information and uncertainty in the market 3. For example, Biais, Hillion and Spatt
(1995) consider spread as a measure of uncertainty and ﬁnd that wider spreads lead to more limit than
market orders. Ahn, Bae and Chan (2001) and Ranaldo (2004) ﬁnd that the order submission decision
depends on volatility and market depth. Handa, Schwartz and Tiwari (2003) extend this to examine the
importance of the relative depth on the two-sides of market. Tkatch and Kandel (2006) ﬁnd that traders’
order submission decisions are based on how long they expect it to take for an order to be executed.
Cao, Hansch and Wang (2004) ﬁnd that the quantity of orders standing behind the best price inﬂuences
price discovery process.
Our paper builds directly on these results but differs in two important aspects. First, we empirically
examine the effect of direct measures of the heterogeneity of expectations on the order submission
decision. Speciﬁcally, we examine the impact of the degree of information heterogeneity between mar-
3AnotableexceptionistheexperimentalstudyofBloomﬁeld, OHaraandSaar(2005)inwhichtheyareabletoartiﬁcially
generate speciﬁc information environments and examine their inﬂuence on order submission choices.
6ket participants on the order submissions of foreign exchange traders before major macroeconomic
announcements as well as the inﬂuence of information shocks after the announcements (and their po-
tential interactions). This allows us to more precisely measure the inﬂuence of changes in the markets
perception of current and future fundamental values on asset prices and trading strategies than in past
studies. Second, we use a simultaneous equations framework to capture the joint nature of the order ag-
gressiveness and order size decision in order submissions. Previous studies have focused solely on the
type of order (order aggressiveness) decision neglecting the potential trade-offs between aggressiveness
and size.
We focus on the periods surrounding major macroeconomic announcements because regularly
scheduled macroeconomic announcements represent one of the major sources of information in the for-
eign exchange market. Theoretically, Harris and Raviv (1993) and Kim and Verrechia (1994) propose
that a greater dispersion of beliefs leads to higher trading volume. Previous studies such as Mankiw,
Ries and Wolfers (2004) and Swanson (2006) document signiﬁcant belief dispersions among traders
before macroeconomic announcements and that the degree of dispersion varies across macroeconomic
announcements. Examining the effect of belief dispersion, studies have documented that the degree
of heterogeneity of expectations affects the dynamics of asset prices and trading volume (e.g. Shalen
(1993), Berger et al. (2008), Jongen et al. (2008), Yan and Xiong (2009)). Studies such as Green (2004)
and Pasquariello and Vega (2007) use the dispersion in beliefs before announcements as a proxy for the
dispersion in private beliefs among traders in the Treasury market. They found that the degree of belief
dispersion signiﬁcantly affects how trading incorporates new information into the market price. Sarkar
and Schwartz (2009) suggests that the heterogeneity of expectations affects the side of trades as well.
We extend these studies by examining whether and how belief dispersion affects traders order choice
decisions in a limit order market. Similar to Green (2004), we focus on the one hour window around
these announcements.
Inadditiontobeliefdispersionbeforetheannouncements, wealsoconsidertheeffectofinformation
surprises (i.e. the effect of differences between the actual announcement and the expected announce-
ment). Thus our paper is also related to studies such as Evans and Lyons (2008), Osler et al. (2007),
7Rime et al. (2008) and Tham (2007). These studies ﬁnd empirical evidence that order ﬂow (the net
volume of buy and sell transactions) conveys more private information subsequent to announcements.
Kim and Verrechia (1994 and 1997) show that the release of public information can lead to the endoge-
nous creation of private information. Consequently, we also examine the role of information shocks on
the order submission decision. Our empirical models examine the role of information shocks and belief
dispersion with other factors which are known to inﬂuence traders order submission decisions.
Because very few studies directly examine the effect of changes in the information environment
on order submission strategies, our study provides useful new insights into this important area. Two
exceptions are the empirical study of Carlson and Lo (2006) and the experimental study of Bloomﬁeld,
OHara and Saar (2005). Carlson and Lo (2006) examine changes in traders order submission strategies
around a single unanticipated macroeconomic announcement. They ﬁnd signiﬁcant changes in the
order submission strategies before and after the announcement. Bloomﬁeld, OHara and Saar (2005)
examine the order submission decisions of informed and uninformed traders in an experimental setting
to document how changes in the information environment impact the types of orders trader submit.
We extend these studies by examining changes in traders order submission decisions around a series of
regularly scheduled macroeconomic announcements. The use of scheduled announcements allows us
to quantify the differences in market participants beliefs before the announcement to fully explore the
effect of differences in the heterogeneity of expectations on traders order submission strategies. We can
also study the impact of differences in the magnitude of the information shocks on order submission
decisions after the event. Thus our study is able to more clearly examine the effects of changes in
market conditions on the order submission decision before and after these announcements. By using
a larger number of real-world events compared to previous studies, we can more easily generalize our
ﬁndings.
III. Data
We utilize two datasets in the paper. The ﬁrst data set contains the data on the electronic order sub-
missions of the majority of traders in the Canadian dollar - U.S. dollar currency pair. The second data
8set consists of the forecasts provided by analysts in advance of the most important macroeconomic
announcements as well as the results from the actual announcements in Canada and the U.S.. Below
we discuss each data set in more detail.
A. Foreign Exchange Market Data
The ﬁrst data set contains all of the orders submitted to Reuters, one of the worlds largest electronic
foreign exchange broker systems, for the Canadian dollar-U.S. dollar currency pair over the period from
January 1st, 2005 to December 31st, 2005. The system is an electronic order book to which foreign
exchange dealers can submit market and limit orders of any size US $1 million and greater 4. Dealers
using the system observe the ﬁve most recent transactions as well as the most recent best quoted bid
and ask prices and the corresponding depth on the bid and ask side of the market. In our data set, we
not only have this information but we also have information on every order submitted to the market
(not just those standing in the limit order book at the best bid and ask prices). The data we have on each
order includes the: order type, quoted price for limit orders, order size, time the order was submitted
and when the order was either executed or cancelled. Consequently, we have both the information that
is publicly available to all traders as well as measures related to private information.
Using order submission data from the foreign exchange market has several advantages over similar
equity data. For example, the electronic platform operates 24-hours a day, 7-days a week with no
speciﬁc opening and closing hours. This allows our analysis to cover the periods both before and after
all of our macroeconomic announcements without having to worry about the effects of special market
clearing mechanisms around these times (e.g., at the opening or closing of markets as documented in
Hamao and Hasbrouck (1995) and Davies (2003)). Further, the electronic platform is a purely order-
driven market so there is no need to worry about the potential role of players such as the market maker
whose role is to provide liquidity and price stability which may therefore impact observed market
behavior. Finally, for the foreign exchange market there are a large number of signiﬁcant information
announcements for which the timing is known in advance and therefore analysts’ provide forecasts.
This allows us to cleanly estimate the belief dispersion before the announcement as well as the level
4Traders may also cancel outstanding limit orders which have not yet been executed.
9of the surprise contained in the announcement. Thus, our data set allows us to clearly investigate how
traders order submission decisions inﬂuence the supply and demand for an asset (the Canadian dollar
US dollar) around signiﬁcant information announcements.
The dataset also has a distinct advantage over many of the commonly used data sets for the foreign
exchange market. It is one of the few data sets available with a long period of complete tick-by-tick
information on the limit order book in the inter-dealer foreign exchange market. Other studies such
as Evans and Lyons (2002a and 2002b), Osler, Mende and Menkhoff (2007) and Bjonnes, Osler and
Rimes (2008) use similar but more limited information (e.g., from a single dealer or for completed
transactions but not for the complete order book). Our study therefore provides a valuable complement
to these others. The complete data set consists of 1,358,614 quotes for the Canadian dollar-U.S. dollar
over the sample period, but we focus on a subset of these quotes as we focus on the order submission
activities in the one-hour window around the announcements.
B. Announcement Data
The second dataset we use allows us to characterize the information environment traders are experienc-
ing. We have all of the major regularly scheduled macroeconomic announcements in both the U.S. and
Canada in 2005. This data set allows us to study the evolution of the information environment in the
foreign exchange market. To be consistent with previous research, we use the announcements found to
have the largest impact in these studies. The full list of announcements we consider can be found in
Table 1.
The data we use includes measures obtained from surveys performed by Bloomberg in which they
ask market participants what they are expecting in the upcoming macroeconomic announcement. We
measure market belief dispersion as the standard deviation of the individual forecasts from the market
participants survey as in Green (2004) and Pasquariello and Vega (2007). The belief dispersion of
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In Table 1, we can see that there is a signiﬁcant variation in the level of belief dispersion and
surprises across events. This ensures that our analysis should include a wide variety of information
environments to allow us to provide general insights into the role played by differences in traders
expectations and uncertainty on their order submission decisions.
C. Descriptive Statistics
To limit the impact of intraday seasonalities on our results, we focus our analysis on order submission
activities in the one-hour window around our set of macroeconomic announcements. The announce-
ments occur at either 7:00 EST, 8:30 EST or 10:00 EST depending on the announcement. The statistics
in Table 2 describe the state of the order book during these time periods. The data includes all of the
days in our sample and this data is then subdivided to include only days with major announcements
before and after the announcements. Looking at the depth at the best prices, we ﬁnd that the depth
is lowest before the announcements and highest after the announcements. Assuming that traders are
more hesitant to trade before an announcement and are more eager to trade after the resolution of
uncertainty following an announcement, this result is as one may have expected. It is interesting to
note that the overall depth in the order book (the depth at both the best and behind the best prices) is
larger on announcement days. Given that our measure of the depth at prices behind the best price is
not observable by traders, the statistics suggest that traders hide their positions as information unfolds,
especially before the announcements. For our other measures of market conditions, we ﬁnd that the
11average spreads are widest and trading volumes are highest around announcements with the spreads be-
ing wider before and volumes after the announcements. These results suggest that there are differences
between the announcement and non-announcement days and there are also differences before and after
the announcements.
IV. Empirical Model and Results
In this section, we present the simultaneous equations models we use to study the relationship between
traders information, market conditions and traders order submission choices. We ﬁrst estimate this
model to compare the trading behavior between announcement and non-announcement days. Since
we ﬁnd differences between announcement and non-announcement days, we focus our analysis on an-
nouncement days to better understand the sources of these differences. Within our set of announcement
days, we compare the trading behavior before and after our announcements.
A. Framework
When submitting an order in a limit order market, traders have to make two key decisions: the ag-
gressiveness and the size of the order. Order aggressiveness is determined by the execution priority of
the order. In this sense, market orders are the most aggressive - they are executed immediately. Limit
orders at prices at the best or better than the best price standing in the market get executed next and
are therefore next in order aggressiveness. The limit orders submitted at prices further behind the best
price have correspondingly lower execution priorities and may not even be executed. Consequently,
we classify order aggressiveness as highest for market orders followed by limit orders at the best price
and limit orders submitted at prices behind the best price. Order size is another key dimension of the
order submission decision. Though it gets less attention, recent studies such as Goettler, Parlour and
Rajan (2005 and 2009) and Rosu (2010)) ﬁnd that there are strategic trade-offs with respect to traders
decisions on order aggressiveness and quantity.
To completely model the order submission decision, we set up a simultaneous equations model
to capture the joint order aggressiveness and quantity decisions made by traders (similar to Lo and
12Sapp (2010)). For the order aggressiveness, we use an ordered probit model to capture the discrete
nature of order aggressiveness. More speciﬁcally, we create a vector of the discrete choices of order
aggressiveness at time t, It, which depends on the latent order aggressiveness variable, I
t , which is
assumed to be continuous. The values range from 4 for the most aggressive orders (market orders) to
1 for the least aggressive orders (limit orders that were submitted at prices behind the best price). The
latent order aggressiveness is related to the choice of order type as follows:
It = 4 if   1 < I

t  1 (market order)
3 if 1 < I

t  2 (limit orders improving the best quote)
2 if 2 < I

t  3 (limit orders at the best quote)
1 if 4 < I

t  1 (limit orders behind the best quote)
To model order size, we use a censored regression framework. A censored regression is employed
because there is a minimum order size of US$1 million in the Reuters electronic brokerage system used
in the foreign exchange market. This means that our model may have orders that would ideally have
been less than US$1 million but had to be submitted at US $1 million. Therefore the observed quantity
at time t, qnt, depends on the latent quantity, qn
t, such that
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The vector xt contain our set of independent variables deﬁned below found to inﬂuence traders
order submission decisions with previous studies. We use two-stage least square in estimating the
model. In the ﬁrst stage of regression, we include two sets of instruments in addition to xt to aid in
the identiﬁcation. Speciﬁcally, in the qn
t equation, we use number of orders submitted behind the
13best quotes on the same side of the market during the past 5-minute interval,zI
t, as instrument. In the I
equation, the quantity submitted behind the best quotes on the same side of the market during the past 5-
minute interval, z
qn
t , is used as instrument. They are valid instruments for identiﬁcation in our model for
two main reasons. First, since order submission activities behind the best quotes are not observable to
market participants, these measures should not be correlated with the error term, theoretically speaking.
Furthermore, these variables are signiﬁcantly correlated with endogenous explanatory variables. Thus
our instruments should lead to consistent estimation.
We estimate our models of traders order submission strategies in the half-hour interval before the
announcement and in the half-hour interval after the announcements. However, we exclude observa-
tions in the two minute intervals immediately before and after the announcements to allow for potential
errors (such as recording errors) in the announcement time.
B. Independent Variables
The variables which we include in our models, xt, were chosen because of their documented impact on
order submission strategies in previous research. We list and deﬁne these variables below.
Spread = pa
0 pb
0 is the differencebetween the best ask price, pa
0, and the best bid price, pb
0, standing
inthemarketattheendofeachinterval. Anincreasingspreadisgenerallythroughanincreaseinmarket
uncertainty and an increase in the asymmetry of information across market participants (e.g., Foucault,
Moinas and Theissen (2007)). Both market uncertainty and an increase in asymmetric information
increase the price risk for market orders and therefore increase the likelihood of traders submitting
less aggressive orders (e.g., Foucault (1999) and Ahn, Bae and Chan (2001)). Thus we expect that
dealers would submit fewer market orders as the spread increases. Similarly, we expect a decrease in






i ))2 is the realized volatility of returns in the previous
15-minute period. This is estimated as the volatility of the mid-point of the best bid and ask prices,
log(pmid
i+1), standing in the market at the end of each minute during the past 15 minutes. As suggested
14by Foucault (1999) and Foucault, Kadan and Kandel (2005), among others, if increasing volatility is a
signal of an increase in uncertainty regarding the future value of the asset, we should see an increase
in the number of limit orders posted as volatility increases (i.e., more orders are submitted at less
aggressive prices). On the other hand, Cohen et al. (1981) point out that as price uncertainty increases
risk-averse dealers place a premium on ensuring the execution of their trades. As a consequence,
their model suggests we should see an increase in market orders (more aggressive orders) as volatility
increases. This leaves the role of volatility on order aggressiveness an empirical question and therefore
an important factor to control for. With respect to the quantity decision, previous studies suggest that
liquidity is inversely related to volatility (e.g., Ahn, Bae and Chan (2001), Bae, Jang and Park (2003),
Ranaldo (2004) and Foucault, Moinas and Theissen (2007)), so we expect to see a decrease in the size
of the orders submitted as the level of volatility increases.
Dpthbst
same is the accumulated depth at the best quote on the same side of the market as the submitted
order. For example, if an ask order is submitted, Dpthbst
same is the depth accumulated at the best price on
the ask side of the market, pa
0. An increase in the depth on the same side of the market would indicate
an increase in the competition for order execution resulting in dealers wanting to submit smaller, more
aggressive orders to try to increase their likelihood of timely execution (e.g. Parlour (1998), Biais,
Hillion and Spatt (1995) and Hall and Hautsch (2006 and 2007)).
Dpthbhd
same is the cumulative depth at prices behind the best quote on the same side of the market. For
example, if an ask order is submitted, Dpthbhd
same is the depth accumulated at prices behind (worse than)
thebestask price, pa
0. This partofthe bookisnot observableto marketparticipants. Thus iftraders react
to changes in behind best depth, it indicates a presence of private information. One possible source is
clients order ﬂow base. Recent studies such as Bloomﬁeld, OHara and Saar (2005), Kaniel and Liu
(2006) and Goettler, Parlour and Rajan (2005 and 2009) suggest that informed traders optimally submit
limit orders so the depth behind the best price represents bets backed up by real money on the future
direction of price changes. As a result, we could expect traders viewing this increase in depth will
submit smaller, less aggressive orders when the behind best depth increases.
Dpthbst
opp is the accumulated depth at the best quote on the opposite side of the market. An increase
15in the depth available at the best price on the opposite side of the market implies market orders are less
costly because they are less likely to have to walk up/down the order book to be executed. Consequently
more depth on the opposite side of the market should encourage market orders.
Dpthbhd
opp is the accumulated depth behind the best quote on the opposite side of the market. The
arguments with respect to the inﬂuence of this information on order submission strategies are similar
to those for the depth behind the best price.
PrImpt is the price impact of order ﬂow. It is estimated using the following regression based on





i )) =  + PrImptOFi + "i (2)
where i is the time interval, i = 1;2;:::;15, and order ﬂow is deﬁned as OF = number of buy trades  
number of sell trades. Building on the work of Evans and Lyons (2002a), a growing literature has
documented a strong relationship between order ﬂow and information ﬂows. The basic argument is
that an increased willingness for traders to buy (or sell) as reﬂected in the order ﬂow measure, indicates
an asymmetry of information in the market. Consequently, an increase in the price impact of order
ﬂow may signal an asymmetry of information which would provide traders with an incentive to submit
smaller limit orders at these times.
C. Empirical Estimation: Announcement days vs Non-announcement days
We start by testing for differences in dealers order submission strategies on announcement versus non-
announcementdays. Weusethesameonehourintervalsforbothannouncementandnon-announcement
days to control for the potential inﬂuence of intraday seasonalities. In each case the analysis is divided
into two parts: the half-hour interval before and the half-hour after the announcement. Speciﬁcally, we





















news + bxxt + b
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x xtD
news + et (3)
The variable Dnews is a dummy variable with a value of 1 if the day includes a news announcement and
0 otherwise. The variables news
x and bnews
x measure the marginal impact of announcements on order
16submission strategies.
The results from the estimation of Equation (3) are presented in Table 3. The ﬁrst set of columns re-
ports the estimates and p-values in the period before the announcements and the second set of columns
contains the values after the announcements. Although the results are similar in the time periods be-
fore and after the announcements, there are signiﬁcant differences between the announcement and
non-announcement days. The estimated coefﬁcients on the Dnews dummy variable are statistically sig-
niﬁcant after the announcements in the aggressiveness and quantity equations. This suggests that after
the announcement there are less aggressive, larger orders than usual. These ﬁndings are consistent with
our belief that the resolution of uncertainty around announcements inﬂuences order submission choices
and further they indicate a role for both aggressiveness and size in order submission strategies.
To investigate the trade-off between aggressiveness and quantity, we consider the role of each in our
models and how it changes on announcement days. We ﬁnd that order aggressiveness increases as size
increases, but the effect is smaller on announcement days. That is, larger orders tends to be associated
with less aggressive orders on announcement days. On days with announcements the relationship is no
longer statistically signiﬁcant. These results conﬁrm that order aggressiveness (order type) and quantity
are jointly determined, and the relationship changes around announcement times when uncertainty is
increasing.
Next we examine the differences in the roles played by our independent variables in the order
submission decision on announcement versus non-announcement days. The interaction of the news
dummy variable and each of our independent variables allows us to determine how the impact of these
factors may be inﬂuenced by the different information environments on announcement versus non-
announcement days. In virtually every case the Dnews interaction accentuates the inﬂuence of the
control variables on the order aggressiveness and quantity choices.
The price impact of order ﬂow, PrImpt, is related to less aggressive yet larger orders. Traders
observe an increase in the impact of executed orders on prices to signal an increase in price risk, which
may come from a thin market. So they submit less aggressive limit orders to avoid price risk. With
the interaction of Dnews with PrImpt we ﬁnd that the interaction accentuates this relationship – it is
17signiﬁcantly negative. Consequently, the uncertainty regarding announcements highlights any already
existing concerns about price risk.
An increase in the depth at the best quote on the same side of the market, Dpthbst
same is associated
withmoreaggressive, largerordersondayswithannouncements. Thissuggeststhatmarketparticipants
are less willing to wait and join the already existing queue around announcements. The coefﬁcient on
the best depth on the opposite side of the market indicates that an increase in depth at the best price
on the opposite side of the market is associated with less aggressive, larger orders (more so on days
with announcements). This is not consistent with our hypothesis that increasing opposite side depth
at the best price being associated with market orders. One possible reason is that deepening depth
on the opposite side of the market indicates more traders ”vote” on existing price. Thus traders more
conﬁdently join existing quote on the same side of the market. The interaction between Dnews and the
depth behind the best quote is signiﬁcantly negative when the depth is on the same side of the market
but positive on the opposite side of the market. This suggests that market participants take increases in
the behind best depth as a signal of future price movements around announcements. For example, upon
seeing an increasing behind best depth on the ask side of market, traders on the bid side of market may
interpret that as a signal of future increase in price and so submit a more aggressive bid order before
the price change is realized.
The estimated coefﬁcient on the interaction of Dnews with our indirect measures of market uncer-
tainty (spread and volatility) are in the hypothesized directions. Speciﬁcally, as spread increases we
ﬁnd that order aggressiveness decreases but only signiﬁcantly so after announcements. For order size,
we ﬁnd that orders are smaller as the spread increases before announcement. The result suggests that
traders tend to avoid price risk before announcement by posting smaller orders and posting limit orders
after announcement.
Increases in price uncertainty signalled by an increase in volatility are related to an increase in order
aggressiveness and smaller orders. The added uncertainty of a major announcement accentuates this
effect for order aggressiveness with traders submitting even more aggressive orders but, surprisingly,
larger orders after the announcements. The results conﬁrm with Cohen et al.(1981) that risk averse
18traders place a premium on execution of orders when uncertainty increases.
Overall, these results suggest that there are signiﬁcant differences in how traders interpret informa-
tion and react to market conditions around announcements. In the next section we examine the role of
differences in belief dispersions before the announcements and the news component from the revelation
of information after the announcement on traders order submission strategies.
D. Empirical Estimation: Role of Belief Dispersion Before Announcements
Focusing on just the days with announcements, we start by exploring how the dispersion of beliefs
before the announcements affects traders order submission strategies. Since there are occasionally
days with multiple announcements, we use only days with a single announcement in our analysis to
ensure that we more cleanly capture the information environment on that day. Belief dispersion at
time t is captured using the belief dispersions, DIS, for the upcoming announcements measured as
discussed earlier. To capture the inﬂuence of belief dispersion on its own or through the interaction
with other factors, we estimate the following system of simultaneous equations:
I
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DIS + bxxt + b
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x xtDIS + et (4)
Table 4 presents the results from the estimation of Equation (4). The ﬁrst three columns contain
the results for the order aggressiveness equation, I, and the second set of three columns are for the
quantity equation, qn.
Looking at the ﬁrst column of the order aggressiveness equation, we ﬁnd that increased dispersion is
related to the submission of less aggressive orders. There is a positive correlation between quantity and
order aggressiveness in all speciﬁcations at 1% signiﬁcance level but it reverses as dispersion increases
with qn  DIS signiﬁcantly negative. But overall more aggressive orders tends to be of larger size.
For the quantity equations, we ﬁnd that orders are signiﬁcantly larger as order aggressiveness increases.
Overall the results suggest that traders respond to the uncertainty before the announcement, but the
impact on size is less consistent.
19We next examine whether other independent variables affect the order submission decision and how
they interact with the level of belief dispersion. The estimate of the price impact of orders, PrImpt,
provides insight into how price risk inﬂuences order submission decisions under different levels of
belief dispersion. An increase in PrImpt indicates that the same size order will have a larger price
impact at these times and traders protect themselves by submitting less aggressive orders at these times,
but it is really a result of increasing levels of belief dispersion. For quantity, we ﬁnd an increase in
quantity as the price impact increases, but this is also mainly when belief dispersion is increasing. The
results suggest that the major inﬂuence of our price impact measure is when belief dispersion is high.
The impact of depth on order aggressiveness tends to be weakened and order size drops when
beliefdispersionwidens. Forexample, whenuncertaintyonupcomingannouncementincreases, market
participants tends to place more (less) aggressive orders when the behind best depth on the opposite
(same) side of market deepens than the control group. This suggest that traders tend less to infer price
direction from behind best depth, which is their private information. These results suggest that market
participants tend to infer less information from the depth in the limit order book as belief dispersion
increases.
Considering the spread, we ﬁnd that the spread coefﬁcient is negative and signiﬁcant at the 1% level
in the order aggressiveness equation in Model (3) so a wider spread is associated with less aggressive
orders. This is consistent with Foucault (1999). The impact of spread is, however, sensitive to the level
of dispersion – its interaction with DIS is signiﬁcantly positive in the order aggressiveness equation.
The impact of spread is only signiﬁcant for order size in the model without DIS. These results suggest
that orders become more aggressive when spread widens as belief dispersion increases. Assuming
that an increasing spread is indicative of decreasing market liquidity or an increase in asymmetric
information in the market, traders become more sensitive to execution risk when the level of belief
dispersion is wide.
Considering the role of volatility, we ﬁnd that increasing volatility is related to a signiﬁcant in-
crease in the aggressiveness of orders but does not signiﬁcantly impact order size. This suggests that
traders become more concerned about execution risk as volatility increases. The effect of volatility on
20aggressiveness tends to attenuate when belief dispersion is wide. The coefﬁcient of V lty  DIS is
signiﬁcantly negative. Thus when uncertainty about upcoming announcement is wide, traders tend to
be more reluctant to submit aggressive orders even when price movement is volatile.
E. Empirical Estimation: Role of Belief Dispersion After Announcements
The ﬁnal stage of our analysis examines the changes in order submission strategies after the revelation
of information from the announcement. The analysis focuses on two issues. First, we examine whether
belief dispersion continues to play a role in order submission decisions after the announcements. Sec-
ond, we examine whether the order submission decision is affected by the interaction between belief
dispersion and the magnitude of information shocks.
To examine the ﬁrst question regarding whether belief dispersion still inﬂuences the order submis-
sion decision after the announcement, we estimate the following system of equations in each of the two
15-minute horizons after the announcement:
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The analysis is performed separately on the period from 3 minutes until 15 minutes immediately after
the announcement and the subsequent 15-minute interval. This allows us to investigate how belief
dispersion affects order submission strategies immediately after the announcement as well as after the
market has had some time to digest the information. If our measure of belief dispersion reﬂects only the
uncertainty regarding the information contained in the announcement, we should not see an impact by
dispersion on order submissions after the announcement, especially in the second 15-minute interval.
Studies such as Andersen et al. (2003) suggest that most of the information from an announcement is
incorporated into prices (and thus into trading behavior) within the ﬁrst ﬁfteen minutes. Alternatively,
belief dispersion may be an indicator of uncertainty regarding overall market fundamentals which can
remain after the announcement.
Our results in Table 5 demonstrate that belief dispersion continues to signiﬁcantly affect order sub-
mission strategies after announcements. In both the ﬁrst and second 15 minute interval after announce-
21ment, the term DIS is signiﬁcantly negative. This suggests that traders react to belief dispersion (or
allow it to inﬂuence the order submission choices) before the announcement and they continue to sub-
mit limit orders to protect themselves from price uncertainty after the announcement. However, the
interaction term of quantity with belief dispersion, qn  DIS is signiﬁcantly positive. This suggests
thatlargerordersizetendstobemoreaggressivewhenbeliefdispersionishigherbeforeannouncement.
The result suggest that traders are more conﬁdent to submit market orders after release of announce-
ment.
The results with the rest of the independent variables and the relative levels of signiﬁcance are
similar to the case before the announcement for the ﬁrst 15-minute interval after the announcement.
The impact of independent variables tend to attenuate when dispersion before announcement is wide.
Thus the effect of our independent variables still depend on belief dispersion immediately after the
announcement. However, the dependence on the level of belief dispersion changes in the second 15-
minute interval after the announcements. Dispersion before announcement still weakens the effect of
price impact and best depth on the opposite side of market on order aggressiveness. But the impact
is not signiﬁcant any more for the rest of independent variables. Similar results hold for the order
size equation. With the exception of the interaction terms of depth on the opposite side of the market,
dispersion does not have an impact on order size in the second 15-minute interval after announcement
Next, we examine whether and how the level of belief dispersion interacts with the magnitude of
the information shocks from the announcements. Table 6 characterizes how both belief dispersion and
information shocks affect order submission. Panel A highlights the role of just information shock,
measured by the absolute standardized announcement surprise, whereas the potential interactions of
both information shock and belief dispersion is presented in Panel B. We divide the orders into terciles
based on the absolute value of the size of the surprise. Panel A shows that there are more and larger
orders submitted after the largest surprises. These results suggest possible changes in traders order
submissions after surprises.
In Table 6B, we examine if the traders reaction to the information shock is inﬂuenced by the level of
dispersion in analysts expectations before the announcement. We ﬁnd that as the dispersion before the
22announcement increases, there are more orders of all types for the same level of surprise. This increase
is even stronger when the surprise is higher. For the quantity of the orders, we ﬁnd that the quantities
are larger as dispersion increases for all order aggressiveness levels. These results indicate a clear role
for both dispersion and surprise in how traders make their order submission decisions.
To formally examine how order submission decisions depend on the interaction of belief dispersion
and information shocks, we divide the sample into two sub-sample based on median dispersion and
we examine how order submission decision depends on the size of information shocks measured by
jSURj. More speciﬁcally, we estimate the following equations using the two samples
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Table 7 shows the results of estimating Equation (6). The size of absolute surprise signiﬁcantly
affect order aggressiveness and order size when belief dispersion is low in the ﬁrst 15-minute interval.
The effect on order aggressiveness remains signiﬁcant in the second 15-minute interval. On the other
hand, absolute surprise does not affect order submission decision when belief dispersion is high. The
result suggests that when before announcement uncertainty is low but information shock turns out to
be large, traders tends to submit less aggressive orders.
Considering the effect of endogenous variables, we ﬁnd that a larger information shock tends to
lower the impact of order size when belief dispersion is wide in the ﬁrst 15-minute interval. The
opposite holds true in the second 15-minute interval when belief dispersion is low. Larger order size
tends to be more aggressive when belief dispersion is low. This suggests market participants trade off
order aggressiveness and order size differently. They become more conﬁdent to submit larger and more
aggressive orders as information shock from announcement is incorporated into prices, especially when
belief dispersion is low.
When belief dispersion is wide before announcement, traders tend to care less about price risk
by posting aggressive orders when information shock is large. The coefﬁcient of PrImp  jSURj
under high belief dispersion is signiﬁcantly positive in the ﬁrst 3 to 15 interval after announcement.
The effect is not signiﬁcant in the second 15-minute interval. Thus traders seems to care more about
23certain execution when announcement outcome is far from expectation. On the other hand, when belief
dispersion is low, especially in the second 15 minute interval, traders tends to post more aggressive
orders with PrImp being signiﬁcantly positive at 10% interval. This suggests that traders care less
about price risk after incorporation of information into market price. The effect on aggressiveness is
offset though when announcement surprise is large, which seems to suggests a slower incorporation of
information after large surprise.
High belief dispersion in general intensiﬁes the effect of depth variables on order aggressiveness
especially during immediately after announcement. For example, the interaction terms of best depth
and behind best depth on the same side of market with jSURj signiﬁcantly accentuate the impact of the
control group. However the effect is mostly signiﬁcant during the ﬁrst 15-minute interval. The results
conﬁrm with Andersen et al. (2003) and Green (2004) that the effect of announcement surprise is fully
incorporated into prices within the ﬁrst 15 minutes of announcement.
Spread signiﬁcantly affects order size but its impact on order aggressiveness is signiﬁcant at 10%
only when belief dispersion is wide. This is especially so when spread widens under large information
shock. Order size is signiﬁcantly smaller with larger information shock. This suggests that traders
tends to post more aggressive but smaller orders in response to wider spread when information shock
is large.
The effect of volatility concentrates on the second 15 minute interval. Similar to order book depth,
information shock tends to attenuate the effect of volatility on order aggressiveness and order size.
Market participants tend to post less aggressive and larger orders with more volatile prices when in-
formation shock is large. Thus when information shock is large, traders tend to be more reluctant to
submit aggressive orders even when price movement is volatile
V. Conclusion
In this paper we examine the role of belief dispersion in traders’ order submission decisions. Going
back to the foundational work on the role of information in asset prices and market efﬁciency, we
know that information plays a signiﬁcant role in investors decisions. Traders decide when to buy and
24sell their assets based on their current information set and their expectations about the future value of
the asset. More recent work argues that in efﬁcient markets, all price relevant information is quickly
and accurately incorporated into prices. Consequently, market microstructure theorists have developed
models which provide mechanisms through which this may happen but few studies have empirically
examined how this occurs in practice.
In this study we use a novel data set including detailed information on the market’s expectations re-
garding macroeconomic announcements (belief dispersion before the announcement) and information
on how the actual announcement differed from the expected announcement to determine the level of
surprise after the announcement. These two pieces of information allow us to more completely charac-
terize the information environment surrounding these announcements than previous studies. Studying
the relationship between these two important types of information before and after the announcements
we are able to examine the impact of this information on traders’ order submission decisions.
Combining this information with traders order submission decisions in the liquid foreign exchange
market, we are able to empirically characterize the role of this information on the order submission
process. In the ﬁrst stage of the analysis we conﬁrm that there are, in fact, differences in traders order
submission decisions in days with major macroeconomic announcements relative to the days with no
announcements. These results conﬁrm many of the hypotheses regarding what factors inﬂuence traders
order submission decisions (i.e., our set of independent variables). We also ﬁnd that many of these
relationships are actually stronger on days with announcements than without.
Focusing on the days with announcements, we investigate how belief dispersion before announce-
ments inﬂuences traders order submission strategies. We ﬁnd that increasing belief dispersion reduces
the inﬂuence of many factors on traders order submission decision. Traders therefore are impacted by
the level of uncertainty before the announcement. The role of the information in the limit order book
and other market characteristics is lower at these times. When we consider the role of the level of
the surprise in the announcement, we ﬁnd that the surprise plays a larger role in the order submission
decision when the level of belief dispersion had been high before the announcement. However, the role
of surprises is relatively minor in general.
25Our results provide interesting insights into the role of information in traders order aggressiveness
and size decisions. Depending on the source of the uncertainty and the ability to extract private in-
formation from the limit order book, we ﬁnd traders are willing to change the aggressiveness of the
orders they submit to ensure execution and this may also be reﬂected in the order size. Consequently,
our analysis demonstrates how price and execution risk inﬂuence order submissions in general, but the
impact of the different factors measuring market conditions and the state of the limit order book change
depending on the level of uncertainty in the market.
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31Table 1. Macro Announcement
This table reports the list of macroeconomic news announcements we consider in our analysis. N denotes
the total number of announcements during the period from 1/1/2005 to 12/31/2005. Time denotes the time,
in Eastern Standard Time (EST), of the announcement. Mean(Dis) denotes the sample mean dispersion
between the analysts forecasts obtained from Bloomberg surveys, Mean(Sur) denotes the sample mean of
the standardized surprise, Ndis>mean(dis)+std(dis) denotes the number of dispersion measures that were one
standard deviation or more above the mean, Nabs(sur)>1 denotes the number of announcements where the
surprise contained in the announcement was more than 1 standard deviation away from the mean.
Event time N Mean(Dis) Mean(Sur) Ndis>mean(dis)+std(dis) Nabs(sur)>1
CPI (Canada) 7:00:00 12 1.38 -0.33 0 1
Employment Rate (Canada) 7:00:00 12 1.78 0.14 0 1
GDP (Canada) 8:30:00 12 1.93 -0.18 0 4
Retail Sales (Canada) 8:30:00 12 1.42 0.10 1 5
Trade balance (Canada) 8:30:00 12 2.59 0.23 1 2
Consumer Conﬁdence 10:00:00 12 3.61 0.16 3 3
CPI 8:30:00 12 2.63 0.11 2 4
Durable Goods 8:30:00 12 2.87 0.20 2 5
GDP 8:30:00 4 0.95 -0.30 0 0
Initial Unemployment Claims 8:30:00 52 1.29 0.03 6 14
ISM index 10:00:00 12 3.79 0.26 1 4
New Home Sales 10:00:00 12 3.17 0.37 5 5
Change in Nonfarm Payroll 8:30:00 12 2.97 -0.14 2 4
PPI 8:30:00 12 2.03 0.09 1 3
Retail Sales 8:30:00 12 2.19 -0.01 2 4
32Table 2. Summary Statistics
This table reports the summary statistics of our set of variables characterizing the Canadian dollar-US
dollar currency market around major macroeconomic announcements. The order submission data was
obtained from Reuters and covers the period from 1/1/2005 to 12/31/2005. For our announcement days,
the aggregated trading volume ($ billions) and return volatility (%) are based on the mid point of the best
bid-ask quotes in the half hour interval before the announcements and in the half hour interval right after
announcements. The relative spread (10;000), depth at the best bid and ask ($ millions), and depth in the
entire order book ($ millions) are averaged over 5-minute intervals in the corresponding interval. On days
without any major announcements, we calculated the same measures in the one-hour window centered at
7:00 a.m., 8:30 a.m. and 10:00 a.m., the times at which our announcements take place.
mean median std max min skew kurt
Non-Announcement
Depth at best quotes 6.20 5.92 1.09 9.31 4.35 0.74 3.05
Overall Depth 31.96 25.43 18.16 140.66 11.65 2.82 15.17
Spread  100 0.0570 0.0554 0.0180 0.1098 0.0302 1.16 4.26
Trading Volume 161.19 133.00 125.56 675.00 8.00 1.27 4.58
Volatility 1.65 1.49 0.82 4.92 0.43 1.31 4.92
Before Announcement
Depth at best quotes 6.03 5.86 1.61 11.33 2.97 0.83 4.04
Overall Depth 33.13 28.58 17.71 117.37 7.24 1.63 6.85
Spread  100 0.0607 0.0544 0.0232 0.1461 0.0302 1.31 4.52
Trading Volume 172.18 151.00 109.64 628.00 21.00 1.40 5.50
Volatility 1.64 1.42 0.87 5.45 0.44 1.55 5.93
After Announcement
Depth at best quotes 6.50 6.39 1.51 11.81 3.72 0.65 3.52
Overall Depth 35.31 31.01 18.28 112.38 9.82 1.46 5.53
Spread  100 0.0583 0.0523 0.0208 0.1406 0.0299 1.65 6.01
Trading Volume 302.82 267.50 171.82 994.00 52.00 1.11 4.46
Volatility 1.89 1.72 0.95 7.18 0.49 1.51 6.49
33Table 3. Order Submission around Announcement Days versus Non-announcement Days
This table reports the results from the estimation of Equation (2) for order submission strategies. We
examine the effects of our set of independent variables and how they change on days with and without
announcements. The ﬁrst column and the second column present results during the half hour interval before
the announcements and the corresponding time period on days without announcements. The third and
fourth columns present results during the half hour interval after the announcement versus the same time on
non-announcement days. * indicates signiﬁcance at the 10% level, ** indicates signiﬁcance at the 5% level
and *** indicates signiﬁcance at 1% level.
Before After
I qn I qn
I qn I qn
 -0.223*** -0.205***
Dnews 0.007 -0.057 -0.011* 0.157*
^ qn 0.144*** 0.179***
^ I 0.536*** 0.509***
^ qn  Dnews -0.027*** -0.051***
^ I  Dnews 0.107 0.048
PriceImpact -0.034*** 0.081*** -0.005 0.021
PriceImpact  Dnews -0.029*** 0.091*** -0.020*** 0.056***
Dpthbst
same 0.018*** 0.091*** 0.021*** 0.050***
Dpthbst
same  Dnews 0.024*** 0.055*** 0.023*** 0.044***
Dpthbhd
same -0.102*** 0.154*** -0.101*** 0.146***
Dpthbhd
same  Dnews -0.081*** 0.151*** -0.087*** 0.093***
Dpthbst
opp -0.050*** 0.765*** -0.064*** 0.656***
Dpthbst
opp  Dnews -0.027*** 0.665*** -0.017*** 0.573***
Dpthbhd
opp 0.028*** 0.116*** 0.031*** 0.130***
Dpthbhd
opp  Dnews 0.043*** 0.080*** 0.061*** 0.128***
Spread -0.006 -0.072*** -0.013*** -0.064***
Spread  Dnews -0.002 -0.082*** -0.010*** -0.002
V olatility 0.013*** -0.033* 0.012*** -0.007
V olatility  Dnews 0.022*** 0.027 0.007* 0.062***
Likelihood -135537 -199100 -187297 -281598
34Table 4. Effect of Belief Dispersion on Order Submission Strategies: before Announcement
This table reports the estimation results of Equation (4). This model examines the relationship between order
submission strategies, our set of independent variables and belief dispersion. The ﬁrst model only considers
the effect of belief dispersion on order submissions. The subsequent models consider the role of our set of
independent variables and belief dispersion. * indicates signiﬁcance at the 10% level, ** indicates signiﬁcance at
the 5% level and *** indicates signiﬁcance at 1% level.
I Equation qn Equation
Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (1) Model (2) Model (3)
 -0.244 -0.356*** -0.067
DIS -0.013*** -0.018*** -0.07 -0.038
^ qn 0.149*** 0.107*** 0.155***
^ qn  DIS -0.018*** -0.018***
^ I 0.322 0.594*** 0.229
^ I  DIS 0.132** 0.099*
PrImp -0.038*** 0.001 0.100*** -0.033
PrImp  DIS -0.020*** 0.065***
Dpthbst
same 0.021*** 0.009 0.093*** 0.079
Dpthbst
same  DIS 0.007 0.005
Dpthbhd
same -0.077*** -0.218*** 0.144*** 0.353***
Dpthbhd
same  DIS 0.052*** -0.088***
Dpthbst
opp -0.015** -0.064*** 0.657*** 0.789***
Dpthbst
opp  DIS 0.020*** -0.056**
Dpthbhd
opp 0.047*** 0.095*** 0.091*** 0.135*
Dpthbhd
opp  DIS -0.014** -0.022
Spread 0 -0.037*** -0.077*** 0.009
Spread  DIS 0.014** -0.033
V lty 0.030*** 0.088*** 0.022 -0.12
V lty  DIS -0.017*** 0.041

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































36Table 6. Information Shocks, Belief Dispersion and Order Submission Activities
In Panel A, we sort the absolute announcement surprise jsurj into 3 equal groups (terciles) and report the
proportion of orders submitted and the average order size in each group. In Panel B, we compare the proportion
and size of orders based on our measures of surprise and dispersion. For each surprise tercile we consider high and
low belief dispersions. We ﬁrst sort the absolute announcement surprise jsurj into terciles. Within each tercile,
we sort the belief dispersion into high and low groups relative to the median dispersion and report the proportion
of orders submitted and the average order size in each group. The belief dispersion is based on the surveys of
analysts by Bloomberg and the surprise is the actual announcement compared to the median forecast provided by
analysts. The order submission data is for the Canadian dollar-US dollar currency pair on the Reuters electronic
brokerage system from 1/1/2005 to 12/31/2005.
Proportion of Orders Average Order Size
jsurj dis mkt lmt1 lmt2 lmt3 mkt lmt1 lmt2 lmt3
Panel A: Information Shocks and Order Submission Activities
T1 0.074 0.146 0.032 0.036 2.48 2.20 1.80 2.51
T2 0.081 0.159 0.038 0.048 2.45 2.17 1.82 2.48
T3 0.095 0.190 0.048 0.052 2.60 2.31 1.90 2.61
Panel B: Information Shocks, Belief Dispersion and Order Submission Activities
T1 1.01 0.033 0.065 0.014 0.016 2.36 2.16 1.77 2.30
2.78 0.041 0.081 0.018 0.021 2.58 2.24 1.83 2.71
T2 1.25 0.028 0.059 0.013 0.015 2.27 2.05 1.65 2.16
2.58 0.053 0.100 0.025 0.033 2.64 2.29 1.99 2.78
T3 1.40 0.043 0.087 0.020 0.025 2.51 2.28 1.97 2.68
3.68 0.052 0.103 0.027 0.027 2.69 2.34 1.83 2.55
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